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MEAN FIELD AND N-AGENT GAMES FOR OPTIMAL INVESTMENT
UNDER RELATIVE PERFORMANCE CRITERIA
DANIEL LACKER∗ AND THALEIA ZARIPHOPOULOU†
Abstract. We analyze a family of portfolio management problems under relative performance
criteria, for fund managers having CARA or CRRA utilities and trading in a common investment
horizon in log-normal markets. We construct explicit constant equilibrium strategies for both
the finite population games and the corresponding mean field games, which we show are unique
in the class of constant equilibria. In the CARA case, competition drives agents to invest more
in the risky asset than they would otherwise, while in the CRRA case competitive agents may
over- or under-invest, depending on their levels of risk tolerance.
1. Introduction
This paper is a contribution to both the theory of finite population and mean field games
and to optimal portfolio management under competition and relative performance criteria. For
the former, we construct explicit solutions for both n-player and mean field games, providing a
new family of tractable solutions. For the latter, we formulate a new class of competition and
relative performance optimal investment problems for agents having exponential (CARA) and
power (CRRA) utilities, for both a finite number and a continuum of agents.
The finite-population case consists of n fund managers (or agents) trading between a common
riskless bond and an individual stock. The price of each stock is modeled as a log-normal process
driven by two independent Brownian motions. The first Brownian motion is the same for all
prices, representing a common market noise, while the second is idiosyncratic, specific to each
individual stock. Precisely, the ith fund specializes in stock i whose price (Sit)t≥0 is given by
dSit
Sit
= µidt+ νidW
i
t + σidBt, (1)
with constant market parameters µi > 0, σi ≥ 0, and νi ≥ 0, with σi + νi > 0. The (one-
dimensional) standard Brownian motions B,W 1,W 2, . . . ,W n are independent. When σi > 0,
the process B induces a correlation between the stocks, and thus we call B the common noise
and W i an idiosyncratic noise.
Our setup covers the important special case in which all funds trade in the same stock; that
is, µi = µ, νi = 0, and σi = σ for all i = 1, . . . , n, for some µ, σ > 0 independent of i. In this
setting, all stocks are identical and the model is to be interpreted as n agents investing in a
single common stock. These n agents differ in their risk preferences but otherwise face the same
market opportunities. We choose to work with one-dimensional stocks Si for mere simplicity,
but our analysis would adapt with purely notational changes to cover the case where each Si is
a vector of stocks available to agent i. In this multidimensional setting, the “single stock” case
would model the realistic situation of a large number of agents trading in the same vector of
stocks.
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All fund managers share a common time horizon, T > 0, and aim to maximize their expected
utility at T . The utility functions U1, . . . , Un are agent-specific functions of both terminal wealth,
XiT , and a “competition component,” XT , which depends on the terminal wealths of all agents.
We study two representative cases, related to the popular exponential and power utilities.
For the exponential case, we assume that competition affects the wealth additively and is
modeled through the arithmetic average wealth of all agents,
Ui
(
XiT ,XT
)
= −e
− 1
δi
(XiT−θiXT ), where XT =
1
n
n∑
k=1
XkT . (2)
The parameters δi > 0 and θi ∈ [0, 1] represent the i
th agent’s absolute risk tolerance and
absolute competition weight, with small (resp. high) values of θi denoting low (resp. high)
relative performance concern. This model is similar to and largely inspired by that of Espinosa
and Touzi [23].
For the power case, the competition affects the wealth multiplicatively and is modeled through
the geometric average wealth of all agents,
Ui
(
XiT ,XT
)
=
1
1− 1/δi
(
XiTX
−θi
T
)1−1/δi
, where XT =
(
n∏
k=1
XkT
)1/n
. (3)
Now, the parameters δi > 0 and θi ∈ [0, 1] represent the i
th agent’s relative risk tolerance and
relative competition weight. The geometric mean is used here largely for its tractability, but it
also admits a natural interpretation: Quantities of the form er1 , . . . , ern have geometric mean
exp( 1n
∑n
i=1 ri), which indicates that the geometric mean of wealths is simply the exponential of
the arithmetic mean of returns. In this sense, the agents are using returns rather than absolute
wealth in measuring relative performance.
The aim is to identify Nash equilibria, namely, to find investment strategies (pi1,∗t , . . . , pi
n,∗
t )t∈[0,T ]
such that pii,∗t is the optimal stock allocation exercised by the i
th agent in response to the strat-
egy choices of all other competitors, for i = 1, . . . , n. As is usually the case for exponential and
power risk preferences, pii,∗t is taken to be the absolute wealth and the fraction of wealth invested
in the ith stock, respectively. The values pii,∗t may be negative, indicating that the agent shorts
the stock.
Competition among fund managers is well documented in investment practice for both mutual
and hedge funds; see, for example, [1, 3, 11, 19, 22, 27, 37, 41, 52]. As it is argued in these works,
competition can stem, for example, from career advancement motives, seeking higher money
inflows from their clients, preferential compensation contracts. In most of these works, only the
case of two managers has been considered and in discrete time (or two period) models, with
variations of criteria involving risk neutrality, relative performance with respect to an absolute
benchmark or a critical threshold, or constraints on the managers’ risk aversion parameters.
More recently, the authors in [3] proposed a continuous time log-normal model for two fund
managers with power utilities.
Asset specialization is also well documented in the finance literature, starting with Brennan
[10, 20, 44]. Other representative works include [9, 36, 42, 45, 48, 49, 56]. As it is argued in these
works, a variety of factors prompt managers to specialize in individual stocks or asset classes,
such as familiarity, learning cost reduction, ambiguity aversion, solvency requirements, trading
costs and constraints, liquidation risks, and informational frictions.
For tractability, we search only for Nash equilibria in which the investment strategies are
constants (i.e., chosen at time zero). This restriction is quite natural, given the log-normality
of the stock prices, the scaling properties of the CARA and CRRA utilities, and the form of
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the associated competition components. To construct such an equilibrium, we first solve each
single agent’s optimization problem given an arbitrary (but fixed) choice of competitors’ constant
strategies.
Incorporating the competition component X as an additional uncontrolled state process leads
to a single Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation, which we show has a unique separable
smooth solution. Together with the first order conditions, this yields the candidate policies in a
closed-form. We then construct the equilibrium through a set of compatibility conditions, which
also provide criteria for existence and uniqueness. As an intermediate step, we use arguments
from indifference valuation to obtain verification results for these smooth solutions. Specifi-
cally, we interpret each HJB equation as the one solved by the writer of an individual liability
determined by the competition component.
The unique constant Nash equilibrium in each model turns out to be the sum of two compo-
nents. The first is the traditional Merton portfolio (see [43]), which is optimal for the individual
expected utility problem without any relative performance concerns. The second component
depends on the individual competition parameter and on other quantities involving the risk tol-
erance and competition parameters of all agents as well as the market parameters of all stocks.
Naturally, this second component disappears when there is no competition.
In the exponential model, it turns out that competition always results in higher investment in
the risky asset. This is not, however, the case for the power model, mainly because the sign of
the second component might not be always fixed. This sign depends on the value of the relative
risk tolerance, particularly whether it is larger or smaller than one; this is to be expected given
well known properties of CRRA utilities and their optimal portolios (see, for example, the so
called “nirvana” cases in [38]).
In the noteworthy special case of a single stock, common to all agents, the equilibrium strate-
gies are simpler. For both the exponential and the power cases, the Nash equilibrium is of
Merton type but with a modified risk tolerance, which depends linearly on the individual risk
tolerance and competition parameters, with the coefficients of this linear function depending on
the population averages of these parameters.
The expressions for the equilibrium strategies simplify when the number of agents n tends to
infinity. The limiting expressions depend solely on the limit of the empirical distribution of the
type vectors ζi = (x
i
0, δi, θi, µi, νi, σi), for i = 1, . . . , n. We show that these limiting strategies
can be derived intrinsically, as equilibria of suitable mean field games (MFGs). Intuitively, the
finite set of agents becomes a continuum, with each individual trading between the common
bond and her individual stock while also competing with the rest of the (infinite) population
through a relative performance functional affecting her expected terminal utility.
Although explicit solutions are available for our n-agent games, the MFG framework is worth
introducing in this context in part because it extends naturally to more complex models, such as
those involving portfolio constraints or general utility functions. In such models, we expect the
MFG framework to be more tractable than the n-agent games. For instance, [8, 23, 25] study
n-agent models similar to our CARA utility model but notably including equiibrium pricing
and portfolio constraints, leading to difficult n-dimensional quadratic BSDE systems. A MFG
formulation would likely be more tractable, at least reducing the dimensionality of the problem,
though we do not tackle such an analysis in this paper.
The MFG is defined in terms of a representative agent who is assigned a random type vector
ζ = (ξ, δ, θ, µ, ν, σ) at time zero, determining her initial wealth ξ, preference parameters (δ, θ),
and market parameters (µ, ν, σ). The randomness of the type vector encodes the distribution of
the (continuum of) agents’ types.
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For the exponential case, the MFG problem is to find a pair
(
pi∗,X
)
with the following
properties. The investment strategy pi∗ optimizes, in analogy to (2),
sup
pi
E
[
−e−
1
δ (XT−X)
]
, (4)
where XT is the wealth of the representative agent and X the average wealth of the continuum
of agents. Furthermore, at this optimum, the consistency condition X = E[X∗T |F
B
T ] must hold,
where (FBt )t∈[0,T ] is the filtration generated by the common noise B, and X
∗ is the optimal
wealth determined by pi∗.
For the power case, the aggregate wealth X must be consistent with its n-agent form in (3).
With this in mind, note that the geometric mean of a positive random variable Y can be written
as expE[log Y ], whether or not the distribution of Y is discrete. This points to the MFG problem
of finding a pair
(
pi∗,X
)
, such that pi∗ optimizes
sup
pi
E
[
1
1− 1/δ
(
XTX
−θ
)1−1/δ]
, (5)
and, furthermore, the consistency condition X = expE[logX∗T |F
B
T ] holds. While its use in mean
field game theory appears to be new, this notion of geometric mean of a measure is essentially
a special case of the well-studied concept of generalized mean (see [30, Chapter III]).
As in the finite population CARA and CRRA cases, we focus on the tractable class of equilibria
in which the strategy pi∗ is constant in time. Such strategies are still random, measurable with
respect to the (time-zero-measurable) random type vector. We solve the MFG problems directly,
constructing equilibria which agree with the limiting expressions from the n-agent games. In
each model, the solution technique is analogous to the n-agent setting in that we treat the
aggregate wealth term as an uncontrolled state process, find a smooth separable solution of a
single HJB equation, and then enforce the consistency condition. The resulting MFG strategies
take similar but notably simpler forms than their n-agent counterparts and exhibit the same
qualitative behavior and two-component structure discussed above.
Mean field games, first introduced in [40] and [32], have by now found numerous applications
in economics and finance, notably including models of income inequality [26], economic growth
[35], limit order book formation [28], systemic risk [17], optimal execution [34, 13], and oligopoly
market models [18], to name but a few. The closest works to ours are the static model of [29,
Section 6], which is a competitive variant of the Markowitz model, and the stochastic growth
model of [33] which has some mathematical features in common with our power utility model.
That said, our work appears to be the first application of MFG theory to portfolio optimization.
Our results add two new examples of explicitly solvable MFG models. Beyond the linear
quadratic models of [5, 15, 17], such examples are scarce, especially in the presence of common
noise. The only other examples we know of are those in [29, Sections 5 and 7] as well as the
more recent [53], which is linear-quadratic aside from a square root diffusion term. In fact, our
models permit an explicit solution of the so-called master equation (cf. [14]). Moreover, we
wish to emphasize the manner in which we incorporate different types of agents, by randomizing
ζ = (ξ, δ, θ, µ, ν, σ) as described above. Several previous works on MFGs (e.g., [32]) incorporated
finitely many types by tracking a vector of mean field interactions, one for each type, but our
approach has the advantage of seamlessly incorporating (uncountably) infinitely many types.
While randomizing types is a standard technique in static games with a continuum of agents,
the idea has scarcely appeared in the (dynamic) MFG literature; to the best of our knowledge,
it has appeared only in [13].
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the exponential model and study
both the n-agent game and the MFG. In Section 3, we present the analogous results for power
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and logarithmic utilities. For both classes, we provide qualitative comments on the Nash and
mean field equilibria, in Sections 2.3 and 3.3, respectively. We conclude in Section 4 with a
discussion of open questions and future research directions.
2. CARA risk preferences
We consider fund managers (henceforth, agents) with exponential risk preferences with con-
stant individual (absolute) risk tolerances. Agents are also concerned with how their performance
is measured in relation to the performances of their competitors. This is modeled as an additive
penalty term depending on the average wealth, and weighted by an investor specific comparison
parameter.
We begin our analysis with the exponential class because of its additive scaling properties,
which allow for substantial tractability. Furthermore, the exponential class provides a direct
connection with indifference valuation, used in solving the underlying HJB equation.
2.1. The n-agent game. We introduce a game of n agents who trade in a common investment
horizon [0, T ]. Each agent trades between an “individual” stock and a riskless bond. The latter
is common to all agents, serves as the numeraire and offers zero interest rate.
Stock prices are taken to be log-normal, as described in the introduction, each driven by two
independent Brownian motions. Precisely, the price (Sit)t∈[0,T ] of the stock i traded by the i
th
agent solves (1), with given market parameters µi > 0, σi ≥ 0, and νi ≥ 0, with σi + νi > 0.
The independent Brownian motions B,W 1, . . . ,W n are defined on a probability space (Ω,F ,P),
which we endow with the natural filtration (Ft)t∈[0,T ] generated by these n+1 Brownian motions.
Recall that the single stock case is when
(µi, σi) = (µ, σ), and νi = 0, for i = 1, . . . , n,
for some µ, σ > 0 independent of i. Notably, the single stock case was studied in [23] and [25] in
greater generality, incorporating portfolio constraints and more general stock price dynamics.
Each agent i = 1, . . . , n trades using a self-financing strategy, (piit)t∈[0,T ], which represents the
(discounted by the bond) amount invested in the ith stock. The ith agent’s wealth (Xit)t∈[0,T ]
then solves
dXit = pi
i
t(µidt+ νidW
i
t + σidBt), (6)
with Xi0 = x
i
0 ∈ R. A portfolio strategy is deemed admissible if it belongs to the set A, which
consists of self-financing F-progressively measurable real-valued processes (pit)t∈[0,T ] satisfying
E
∫ T
0 |pit|
2dt <∞.
The ith agent’s utility is a function Ui : R
2 → R of both her individual wealth, x, and the
average wealth of all agents, m. It is of the form
Ui(x,m) := − exp
(
−
1
δi
(x− θim)
)
.
We will refer to the constants δi > 0 and θi ∈ [0, 1] as the personal risk tolerance and competition
weight parameters, respectively.1 If agents i = 1, . . . , n choose admissible strategies pi1, . . . , pin,
the payoff for agent i is given by
Ji(pi
1, . . . , pin) := E
[
− exp
(
−
1
δi
(
XiT − θiXT
))]
, with XT =
1
n
n∑
k=1
XkT , (7)
1 Note that (δi, θi), i = 1, . . . , n, are unitless, because all wealth processes are discounted by the riskless bond.
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where the dynamics of (Xit)t∈[0,T ] are as in (6). Alternatively, we may express the above as
Ji(pi
1, . . . , pin) = E
[
− exp
(
−
1
δi
(
(1− θi)X
i
T + θi(X
i
T −XT )
))]
,
which highlights how the competition weight θi determines the i
th agent’s risk preference for ab-
solute wealth versus relative wealth. An agent with large θi (close to one) is thus more concerned
with relative wealth than absolute wealth.
These interdependent optimization problems are resolved competitively, applying the concept
of Nash equilibrium in the above investment setting.
Definition 1. A vector (pi1,∗, . . . , pin,∗) of admissible strategies is a (Nash) equilibrium if, for
all pii ∈ A and i = 1, . . . , n,
Ji(pi
1,∗, . . . , pii,∗, . . . , pin,∗) ≥ Ji(pi
1,∗, . . . , pii−1,∗, pii, pii+1,∗, . . . , pin,∗). (8)
A constant (Nash) equilibrium is one in which, for each i, pii,∗ is constant in time, i.e., pii,∗t = pi
i,∗
0
for all t ∈ [0, T ].2
Remark 2. Because the filtration F is Brownian, it holds for any admissible strategy pi ∈ A
that pi0 is nonrandom. With this in mind, a constant Nash equilibrium will be identified with
a vector (pi1,∗, . . . , pin,∗) ∈ Rn. Note also that the definition of a constant Nash equilibrium still
requires that the optimality condition (8) holds for every choice of alternative strategy, not just
constant ones.
Our first main finding provides conditions for existence and uniqueness of a constant Nash
equilibrium and also constructs it explicitly.
Theorem 3. Assume that for all i = 1, . . . , n we have δi > 0, θi ∈ [0, 1], µi > 0, σi ≥ 0, νi ≥ 0,
and σi + νi > 0. Define the constants
ϕn :=
1
n
n∑
k=1
δk
µkσk
σ2k + ν
2
k(1− θk/n)
and ψn :=
1
n
n∑
k=1
θk
σ2k
σ2k + ν
2
k(1− θk/n)
. (9)
There are two cases:
(i) If ψn < 1, there exists a unique constant equilibrium, given by
pii,∗ = δi
µi
σ2i + ν
2
i (1− θi/n)
+ θi
σi
σ2i + ν
2
i (1− θi/n)
ϕn
1− ψn
. (10)
Moreover, we have the identity
1
n
n∑
k=1
σkpi
k,∗ =
ϕn
1− ψn
.
(ii) If ψn = 1, there is no constant equilibrium.
An important corollary covers the special case of a single stock.
Corollary 4 (Single stock). Assume that for all i = 1, . . . , n we have µi = µ > 0, σi = σ > 0,
and νi = 0. Define the constants
δ :=
1
n
n∑
k=1
δk and θ :=
1
n
n∑
k=1
θk.
2Our notion of Nash equilibrium is more accurately known as an open-loop Nash equilibrium. A popular
alternative is closed-loop Nash equilibrium, in which agents choose strategies in terms of feedback functions as
opposed to stochastic processes. However, for constant strategies, the open-loop and closed-loop concepts coincide.
That is, a constant (open-loop) Nash equilibrium is also a closed-loop Nash equilibrium, and vice versa.
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There are two cases:
(i) If θ < 1, there exists a unique constant equilibrium, given by
pii,∗ =
(
δi + θi
δ
1− θ
)
µ
σ2
.
(ii) If θ = 1, there is no constant equilibrium.
Proof. Apply Theorem 3, taking note of the simplifications ϕn = δµ/σ and ψn = θ. 
Remark 5. For a given agent i, it is arguably more natural to replace the average wealth XT
in the payoff functional Ji defined in (7) with the average over all other agents, not including
herself, i.e., X
(−i)
T =
1
n−1
∑
k 6=iX
k
T . Fortunately, there is a one-to-one mapping between the two
formulations, so there is no need to solve both separately. Indeed, suppose the ith agent’s payoff
is
E
[
− exp
(
−
1
δ′i
(
XiT − θ
′
iX
(−i)
T
))]
,
for some parameters θ′i ∈ [0, 1] and δ
′
i > 0. By matching coefficients it is straightforward to show
that
1
δ′i
(
XiT − θ
′
iX
(−i)
T
)
=
1
δi
(
XiT − θiXT
)
,
when θi ∈ [0, 1] and δi > 0 are defined by
δi =
δ′i
1 + 1n−1θ
′
i
and θi =
θ′i
n−1
n +
1
nθ
′
i
.
We prefer our original formulation mainly because it results in simpler formulas for the equilib-
rium strategies in Theorem 3 and Corollary 4. Moreover, for large n, this choice has negligible
effect on the strategy pii,∗, as the differences |δi − δ
′
i| and |θi − θ
′
i| vanish.
Remark 6. Even in the absence of competition, there are well known technical issues with ex-
ponential preferences in expected utility optimization, in that the wealth may become arbitrarily
negative. This has been studied and partially addressed, essentially by carefully redefining the
class of admissible controls. In particular, one can define admissible strategies such that wealth
processes are supermartingales under all martingale measures with finite entropy. One must
then solve the dual problem, but some technical issues may still remain; see [21, 51]. On the
other hand, more recent work has identified financially meaningful admissibility classes which
often (but not always) contain the desired optimizer; see [6, 7].
Proof of Theorem 3. Let i be fixed. Assume that all other agents, k 6= i, follow constant invest-
ment strategies, denoted by αk ∈ R. Let (X
k
t )t∈[0,T ] be the associated wealth processes,
Xkt = x
k
0 + αk
(
µkt+ νkW
k
t + σkBt
)
,
and also define
Yt :=
1
n
∑
k 6=i
Xkt .
Then, the ith agent solves the optimization problem
sup
pii∈A
E
[
− exp
(
−
1
δi
((
1−
θi
n
)
XiT − θiYT
))]
, (11)
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where (Xit)t∈[0,T ] and (Yt)t∈[0,T ] have dynamics (cf. (6))
dXit = pi
i
t(µidt+ νidW
i
t + σidBt), X
i
0 = x
i
0,
dYt = µ̂αdt+ σ̂αdBt +
1
n
∑
k 6=i
νkαkdW
k
t , Y0 =
1
n
∑
k 6=i
xk0 ,
and where we have abbreviated
µ̂α :=
1
n
∑
k 6=i
µkαk and σ̂α :=
1
n
∑
k 6=i
σkαk.
In the sequel, we will also use the abbreviation
(̂να)2 :=
1
n
∑
k 6=i
ν2kα
2
k.
The value of the supremum in (11) is equal to v(Xi0, Y0, 0), where v(x, y, t) solves the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
vt +max
pi∈R
(
1
2
(σ2i + ν
2
i )pi
2vxx + pi (µivx + σiσ̂αvxy)
)
(12)
+
1
2
(
σ̂α2 +
1
n
(̂να)2
)
vyy + µ̂αvy = 0,
for (x, y, t) ∈ R× R× [0, T ], with terminal condition
v(x, y, T ) = −e−γi(x−G(y)) = − exp
(
−
1
δi
((
1−
θi
n
)
x− θiy
))
.
Applying the first order conditions, equation (12) reduces to
vt −
1
2
(µivx + σiσ̂αvxy)
2
(σ2i + ν
2
i )vxx
+
1
2
(
σ̂α2 +
1
n
(̂να)2
)
vyy + µ̂αvy = 0.
Making the ansatz v(x, y, t) = −f(t) exp
(
− 1δi ((1−
θi
n )x− θiy)
)
yields, for t ∈ [0, T ],
f ′(t)− ρf(t) = 0.
with f(T ) = 1 and
ρ :=
(µi + θiδ
−1
i σiσ̂α)
2
2(σ2i + ν
2
i )
−
θi
δi
µ̂α−
θ2i
2δ2i
(
σ̂α2 +
1
n
(̂να)2
)
. (13)
Therefore, f(t) = e−ρ(T−t) and, in turn,
v (x, y, t) = − exp
(
−
1
δi
((
1−
θi
n
)
x− θiy
)
− ρ(T − t)
)
. (14)
The maximum in (12) and is achieved at
pii,∗(x, y, t) := −
µivx(x, y, t) + σiσ̂αvxy(x, y, t)
(σ2i + ν
2
i )vxx(x, y, t)
.
Direct calculations yield that pii,∗ is constant,
pii,∗ =
δ−1i (1− θi/n)(µi + θiδ
−1
i σiσ̂α)
(σ2i + ν
2
i )δ
−2
i (1− θi/n)
2
=
δiµi + θiσiσ̂α
(σ2i + ν
2
i )(1 − θi/n)
.
We have thus constructed a smooth solution of the HJB equation and calculated its associated
feedback policy, which is constant and thus admissible. Using the explicit form (14) and the
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admissibility of this candidate control, we can establish a verification theorem following well
known arguments in stochastic optimization [24, 50, 55].
Alternatively, we note that the stochastic optimization problem (11) can be alternatively
viewed as the one solved by an agent who is the “writer” of a liability G(YT ) :=
θi
1−θi/n
YT ,
having exponential preferences with risk aversion γi :=
1
δi
(1 − θin ). Similar problems have been
studied in [31, 46], to which we refer the reader for more detailed arguments for the specific
optimization problem at hand.
Therefore, for a candidate portfolio vector (α1, . . . , αn) to be a constant Nash equilibrium, we
need pii,∗ = αi, for i = 1, . . . , n. Let
σα :=
1
n
n∑
k=1
σkαk = σ̂α+
1
n
σiαi.
Then, we must have
αi = pi
i,∗ =
δiµi + θiσiσα
(σ2i + ν
2
i )(1 − θi/n)
−
θiσ
2
i
n(σ2i + ν
2
i )(1− θi/n)
αi,
which implies that
αi =
δiµi + θiσiσα
(σ2i + ν
2
i )(1− θi/n)
(
1 +
θiσ
2
i
n(σ2i + ν
2
i )(1− θi/n)
)−1
=
δiµi + θiσiσα
(σ2i + ν
2
i )(1− θi/n) + σ
2
i θi/n
=
δiµi + θiσiσα
σ2i + ν
2
i (1− θi/n)
. (15)
Multiplying both sides by σi and then averaging over i = 1, . . . , n, gives
σα = ϕn + ψnσα, (16)
with ϕn, ψn as in (9). For equality (15) to hold, equality (16) must hold as well. There are three
cases:
(i) If ψn < 1, then (16) yields σα = ϕn/(1 − ψn), and the equilibrium control is well defined
and given by (10).
(ii) If ψn = 1 and ϕn > 0, then equation (16) has no solution and thus no constant equilibria
exist.
(iii) The remaining case is ψn = 1 and ϕn = 0, in which case equation (16) has infinitely many
solutions. This, however, cannot occur. Indeed, because δi, µi > 0 for all i, we can only
have ϕn = 0 if σi = 0 for all i. Recalling that σi + νi > 0 by assumption, this implies
ψn = 0, which is a contradiction.

Remark 7. One can also compute the equilibrium value function v(x, y, t) of agent i, by ex-
plicitly computing ρ defined in (13), as the quantities µ̂α, σ̂α, and ν̂α are now known. However,
we omit this tedious calculation.
It remains an open problem to determine if there exist Nash equlibria that are not constant,
e.g., equilibria of the feedback form pii,∗ = pii,∗(t, x1, . . . , xn), depending on time and/or the
agents’ wealths. Actually, an adaptation our argument could show that the constant Nash
equilibrium we derived is, in fact, unique among the broader class of equilibria involving wealth-
independent but potentially time-dependent strategies pi = pi(t). The only delicate point is the
solvability of the HJB equation (12), which would force us to consider time-dependence with
appropriate smoothness and growth conditions.
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In addition, focusing on constant Nash equilibria can be justified as follows. It is well known
that, for log-normal models, exponential utilities lead to constant strategies. This holds not
only for the plain investment problem but also, in the absence of competition, for indifference-
type investment problems. The individual optimization problems we encountered in (11) are
directly analogous to these standard indifference-type problems. Wealth-independence is well
documented in this context, even in general semimartingale models. This is precisely the rea-
son exponential utilities are so popular in the areas of asset price equilibrium and indifference
valuation.
2.2. The mean field game. In this section we study the limit as n→∞ of the n-agent game
analyzed in the previous section.
We start with an informal argument, to build intuition and motivate the upcoming definition.
For the n-agent game, we define for each agent i = 1, . . . , n the type vector
ζi := (x
i
0, δi, θi, µi, νi, σi).
These type vectors induce an empirical measure, called the type distribution, which is the prob-
ability measure on the type space
Ze := R× (0,∞) × [0, 1] × (0,∞)× [0,∞) × [0,∞), (17)
given by
mn(A) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1A(ζi), for Borel sets A ⊂ Z
e.
We then see that for each agent i the equilibrium strategy pii,∗ computed in Theorem 3 depends
only on her own type vector ζi and the distribution mn of all type vectors. Indeed, the constants
ϕn and ψn (cf. (9)) are obtained simply by integrating appropriate functions under mn.
Assume now that as the number of agents becomes large, n→∞, the above empirical measure
mn has a weak limit m, in the sense that
∫
Ze
f dmn →
∫
Ze
f dm for every bounded continuous
function f on Ze. For example, this holds almost surely if the ζi’s are i.i.d. samples from m.
Let ζ = (ξ, δ, θ, µ, ν, σ) denote a random variable with this limiting distribution m. Then, we
should expect the optimal strategy pii,∗ (cf. (10)) to converge to
lim
n→∞
pii,∗ = δi
µi
σ2i + ν
2
i
+ θi
σi
σ2i + ν
2
i
ϕ
1− ψ
, (18)
where
ϕ := lim
n→∞
ϕn = E
[
δ
µσ
σ2 + ν2
]
and ψ := lim
n→∞
ψn = E
[
θ
σ2
σ2 + ν2
]
.
The mean field game (MFG) defined next allows us to derive the limiting strategy (18) as
the outcome of a self-contained equilibrium problem, which intuitively represents a game with
a continuum of agents with type distribution m. Rather than directly modeling a continuum of
agents, we follow the MFG paradigm of modeling a single representative agent, who we view as
randomly selected from the population. The probability measure m represents the distribution
of type parameters among the continuum of agents; equivalently, the representative agent’s type
vector is a random variable with law m. Heuristically, each agent in the continuum trades in a
single stock driven by two Brownian motions, one of which is unique to this agent and one of
which is common to all agents. The equilibrium concept introduced in Definition 9 will formalize
this intuition.
10
2.2.1. Formulating the mean field game. To formulate the MFG, we now assume that the prob-
ability space (Ω,F ,P) supports yet another independent (one-dimensional) Brownian motion,
W , as well as a random variable
ζ = (ξ, δ, θ, µ, ν, σ),
independent of W and B, and with values in the space Ze defined in (17). This random variable
ζ is called the type vector, and its distribution is called the type distribution.
Let FMF = (FMFt )t∈[0,T ] denote the smallest filtration satisfying the usual assumptions for
which ζ is FMF0 -measurable and both W and B are adapted. Let also F
B = (FBt )t∈[0,T ] denote
the natural filtration generated by the Brownian motion B.3
The representative agent’s wealth process solves
dXt = pit(µdt+ νdWt + σdBt), X0 = ξ, (19)
where the portfolio strategy must belong to the admissible set AMF of self-financing F
MF-
progressively measurable real-valued processes (pit)t∈[0,T ] satisfying E
∫ T
0 |pit|
2dt < ∞. The
random variable ξ is the initial wealth of the representative agent, whereas (µ, ν, σ) are the
market parameters. In the sequel, the parameters δ and θ will affect the risk preferences of the
representative agent.
In this mean field setup, the single stock case refers to the case where (µ, ν, σ) is nonrandom,
with ν = 0, µ > 0, and σ > 0. In the context of the limiting argument above, this corresponds
to the n-agent game in which µi = µ, νi = ν = 0, and σi = σ for all i. Note that each agent
among the continuum may still have different preference parameters, captured by the fact that
δ and θ are random.
Remark 8. There are two distinct sources of randomness in this model. One source comes from
the Brownian motions W and B which drive the stock price processes over time. The second
source is static and comes from the random variable ζ, which describes the distribution of type
vectors (which includes initial wealth, individual preference parameters, and market parameters)
among a large (in fact, continuous) population. One can then think of a continuum of agents,
each of whom is assigned an i.i.d. type vector at time zero, and the agents interact after these
assignments are made.
To see how to formulate the representative agent’s optimization problem, let us first recall
how the Nash equilibrium in the n-agent game was constructed. We first solved the optimization
problem (12) faced by each single agent i, in which the strategies of the other agents k 6= i were
treated as fixed. However, instead of fixing the strategies of the other agents, we could have just
fixed the mean terminal wealth 1n
∑
k 6=iX
k
T , as this is effectively the only source of interaction
between the agents. This was precisely the idea behind the proof of Theorem 3, and this guides
the upcoming formulation of the MFG.
To this end, suppose that X is a given random variable, representing the average wealth of
the continuum of agents. The representative agent has no influence on X, as but one agent amid
a continuum. The objective of the representative agent is thus to maximize the expected payoff
sup
pi∈AMF
E
[
− exp
(
−
1
δ
(
XT − θX
))]
, (20)
where (Xt)t∈[0,T ] is given by (19). We are now ready to introduce the main definition of this
section.
3One might as well formulate the MFG on a different probability space from the n-agent game, but we prefer
to avoid introducing additional notation.
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Definition 9. Let pi∗ ∈ AMF be an admissible strategy, and consider the F
B
T -measurable ran-
dom variable X := E[X∗T | F
B
T ], where (X
∗
t )t∈[0,T ] is the wealth process in (19) corresponding
to the strategy pi∗. We say that pi∗ is a mean field equilibrium (MFE) if pi∗ is optimal for the
optimization problem (20) corresponding to this choice of X.
A constant MFE is an FMF0 -measurable random variable pi
∗ such that, if pit := pi
∗ for all
t ∈ [0, T ], then (pit)t∈[0,T ] is a MFE.
Typically, a MFE is computed as a fixed point. One starts with a generic FBT -measurable
random variable X, solves (20) for an optimal pi∗, and then computes E[X∗T | F
B
T ]. If we have
a fixed point in the sense that the consistency condition, E[X∗T | F
B
T ] = X , holds, then pi
∗ is a
MFE. Intuitively, every agent in the continuum faces an independent noise W , an independent
type vector ζ, and the same common noise B. Therefore, conditionally on B, all agents face i.i.d.
copies of the same optimization problem. Heuristically, the law of large numbers suggests that
the average terminal wealth of the whole population should be E[X∗T | F
B
T ]. This consistency
condition illustrates the distinct roles played by the two Brownian motions W and B faced by
the representative agent.
Perhaps more intuitively clear is the case where σ = 0 a.s., so there is no common noise term.
In this case, the consistency condition could be replaced with X = E[X∗T ], owing to the fact that
each agent in the continuum faces an i.i.d. copy of the same optimization problem.
We refer the reader to [16] for a detailed discussion of mean field games with common noise,
and to [12, 39] for general results on limits of n-agent games. Alternatively, the so-called “exact
law of large numbers” provides another way to formalize this idea of averaging over a continuum
of (conditionally) independent agents [54].
2.2.2. An alternative formulation of the mean field game. It is worth emphasizing that the
optimization problem (20) treats the type vector ζ as a genuine source of randomness, in addition
to the stochasticity coming from the Brownian motions. However, an alternative interpretation
is given below which will also help in solving the MFG.
As our starting point, note that for a fixed FBT -measurable random variable X we have
sup
pi∈AMF
E
[
−e−
1
δ (XT−θX)
]
= E [u(ζ)] , (21)
where u(·) is a value function defined for (deterministic) elements ζ0 = (x0, δ0, θ0, µ0, ν0, σ0) of
the type space Ze by
u(ζ0) := sup
pi
E
[
− exp
(
−
1
δ0
(
X˜ζ0,piT − θ0X
))]
, (22)
with
dX˜ζ0,pit = pit (µ0dt+ ν0dWt + σ0dBt) , X˜
ζ0,pi
0 = x0,
and where the supremum is over square-integrable processes which are progressively measurable
with respect to the filtration generated by the Brownian motions W and B (noting that the
random variable ζ is absent from this filtration).
For a deterministic type vector ζ0 ∈ Z
e, the quantity u(ζ0) can be interpreted as the value
of the optimization problem (22) faced by an agent of type ζ0. On the other hand, the original
optimization problem on the left-hand side of (21) gives the optimal expected value faced by an
agent before the random assignment of types at time 0.
This new interpretation will be used somewhat implicitly to compute a MFE in the proof of
Theorem 10 below, in the following manner. We may write u(ζ0) = vζ0(x0, 0) as the time-zero
value of the solution of a HJB equation, vζ0(x, t), for (x, t) ∈ R × [0, T ].
4 The optimal value on
4There is some redundancy in this notation, as x0 is already part of the vector ζ0.
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the left-hand side of (21) is then the expectation of these time-zero values, E[vζ(ξ, 0)], when the
random type vector ζ is used.
Similarly, the optimal strategy piζ0,∗ in (22) depends on the fixed value of ζ0. The optimal
strategy for the left-hand side of (21) is then obtained by plugging in the random type vector,
yielding piζ,∗ ∈ AMF. This justifies the interpretation of the strategy pi
ζ0,∗ as the strategy chosen
by an agent with type vector ζ0.
2.2.3. Solving the mean field game. Next, we present the second main result, in which we con-
struct a constant MFE and also provide conditions for its uniqueness. The result also confirms
that the MFG formulation is indeed appropriate, as the MFE we obtain agrees with the limit
of the n-agent equilibrium strategies in the sense of (18).
Theorem 10. Assume that, a.s., δ > 0, θ ∈ [0, 1], µ > 0, σ ≥ 0, ν ≥ 0, and σ + ν > 0. Define
the constants
ϕ := E
[
δ
µσ
σ2 + ν2
]
and ψ := E
[
θ
σ2
σ2 + ν2
]
,
where we assume that both expectations exist and are finite.
There are two cases:
(1) If ψ < 1, there exists a unique constant MFE, given by
pi∗ = δ
µ
σ2 + ν2
+ θ
σ
σ2 + ν2
ϕ
1− ψ
. (23)
Moreover, we have the identity
E[σpi∗] =
ϕ
1− ψ
.
(2) If ψ = 1, there is no constant MFE.
Next, we highlight the single stock case, noting that the form of the solution is essentially the
same as in the n-agent game, presented in Corollary 4.
Corollary 11 (Single stock). Suppose (µ, ν, σ) are deterministic, with ν = 0 and µ, σ > 0.
Define the constants
δ := E [δ] and θ¯ := E[θ].
There are two cases:
(1) If θ < 1, there exists a unique constant MFE, given by
pi∗ =
(
δ + θ
δ
1− θ
)
µ
σ2
.
(2) If θ = 1, there is no constant MFE.
Proof of Theorem 10. The first step in constructing a constant MFE is to solve the stochastic
optimization problem in (20), for a given choice of X . First, observe that it suffices to restrict
our attention to random variables X of the form X = E[XαT |F
B
T ], where X
α solves (19) for some
admissible strategy α ∈ AMF. However, because we are searching only for constant MFE, we
may fix a constant strategy, i.e., an FMF0 -measurable random variable α with E[α
2] <∞.
It is convenient to define, for t ∈ [0, T ],
X t := E[X
α
t |F
B
T ].
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Noting that XT = X, the key idea is then to identify the dynamics of the process (Xt)t∈[0,T ]
and incorporate it into the state process of the control problem (20). Because (ξ, µ, σ, ν, α), W ,
and B are independent, we must have
X t = ξ + µαt+ σαBt,
where we use the notation M = E[M ] for an integrable random variable M .
In turn, for pi ∈ AMF, we define, for t ∈ [0, T ],
Zpit := X
pi
t − θXt,
with (Xpit )t∈[0,T ] solving (19). Then,
dZpit = (µpit − θµα)dt+ νpitdWt + (σpit − θσα)dBt,
with Zpi0 = ξ − θξ.
We have thus absorbed X as part of the controlled state process. As a result, instead of
solving the original control problem (20) we can equivalently solve the Merton-type problem,
sup
pi∈AMF
E
[
− exp
(
−
1
δ
ZpiT
)]
. (24)
As in the discussion in Section 2.2.2, the above supremum equals E[v(ξ− θξ, 0)], where v(x, t) is
the unique (smooth, strictly concave and strictly increasing in x) solution of the HJB equation
vt +max
pi
(
1
2
(
ν2pi2 + (σpi − θσα)2
)
vxx + (µpi − θµα)vx
)
= 0, (25)
with terminal condition v(x, T ) = −e−x/δ. We stress that this HJB equation is random, in the
sense that it depends on the FMF0 -measurable type parameters (δ, θ, µ, ν, σ).
Equation (25) simplifies to
vt −
1
2
(µvx − θσσαvxx)
2
(σ2 + ν2)vxx
− θµαvx +
1
2
(θσα)2vxx = 0.
Making the ansatz v(x, t) = −e−x/δf(t), the above reduces to
f ′(t)− ρf(t) = 0,
with f(T ) = 1, and with ρ given by the FMF0 -measurable random variable
ρ :=
(
µ+ θδσσα
)2
2(σ2 + ν2)
−
θ
δ
µα−
1
2
(
θ
δ
σα
)2
. (26)
Thus, f(t) = e−ρ(T−t), and v(x, t) = −e−x/δf(t). Furthermore, the optimal feedback control
achieving the maximum in (25) is given by
pi∗(x, t) = −
µvx (x, t)− θσσαvxx(x, t)
(σ2 + ν2)vxx(x, t)
= δ
µ
σ2 + ν2
+ θ
σ
σ2 + ν2
σα, (27)
In fact, pi∗ = pi∗(x, t) is FMF0 -measurable and does not depend on (x, t). The optimality of pi
∗
for the problem (24) follows.
Recalling Definition 9, we see that for the candidate control α to be a constant MFE, we need
α = pi∗. In light of (27), pi∗ is a constant MFE if it solves the equation
pi∗ = δ
µ
σ2 + ν2
+ θ
σ
σ2 + ν2
σpi∗. (28)
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Multiply both sides by σ and average to find that σpi∗ must satisfy
σpi∗ = E
[
δ
µσ
σ2 + ν2
]
+ E
[
θ
σ2
σ2 + ν2
]
σpi∗ = ϕ+ ψσpi∗. (29)
We then have the following cases:
(i) If ψ < 1, the above yields σpi∗ = ϕ/(1 − ψ), and using equation (28) we prove part (1).
(ii) If ψ = 1 but ϕ 6= 0, then equation (29) has no solution, and, as a result, there can be no
constant MFE.
(iii) The remaining case is ψ = 1 and ϕ = 0. However, this cannot happen. Indeed, if this were
the case, then ϕ = 0 and the restrictions on the parameters would imply σ = 0 < ν a.s.,
which would in turn yield ψ = 0, a contradiction. This completes the proof of part (2).

Remark 12. Note that the proof above yields a tractable formula for the equilibrium value
function of the representative agent. Since the controlled process (Zpit )t∈[0,T ] starts from Z
pi
0 =
ξ− θξ, the time-zero value to the representative agent (also called u(ζ) in Section 2.2.2) is given
by
v(ξ − θξ, 0) = − exp
(
−
1
δ
(ξ − θξ)− ρT
)
. (30)
It is now straightforward to explicitly compute ρ in (26), using the values of µα and σα. Indeed,
ρ =
1
2(σ2 + ν2)
(
µ+
θ
δ
ϕ
1− ψ
σ
)2
−
θ
δ
(
ψ˜ +
ϕ˜ϕ
1− ψ
)
, (31)
where the constants ϕ˜ and ψ˜ are defined by
ψ˜ = E
[
δ
µ2
σ2 + ν2
]
and ϕ˜ = E
[
θ
µσ
σ2 + ν2
]
.
Notably, in the single stock case, this simplifies further to
ρ =
(
1 +
(
δθ
δ(1 − θ)
)2)
µ2
2σ2
.
Remark 13. Equation (30) essentially provides the solution of the so-called master equation;
see [4] or [14] for an introduction to the master equation in MFG theory. Indeed, the master
equation is a PDE providing a function U = U(x,m, t), where (x, t) ∈ R × [0, T ] and m is a
probability measure on R. The value U(x,m, t) is naturally interpreted as the value at time t
for a representative agent starting with wealth Xt = x, when the distribution of other agents’
wealths is m. In our case, this value is nothing but
U(x,m, t) = v(x− θm¯, t) = − exp
(
−
1
δ
(x− θm¯)− ρ(T − t)
)
,
where m¯ is the mean of the measure m. We do not attempt to make this any more precise,
as the concept of a master equation has not yet been settled for models with different types of
agents.
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2.3. Discussion of the equilibrium. We focus most of the discussion on the mean field equi-
libria of Theorem 10 and Corollary 11, as the n-agent equilibria of Theorem 3 and Corollary 4
have essentially the same structure.
Recall first that the MFE pi∗ is FMF0 -measurable or, equivalently, ζ-measurable where ζ =
(ξ, δ, θ, µ, ν, σ) is the type vector. The randomness of ζ captures the distribution of type vectors
among the population, while a single realization of ζ can be interpreted as the type vector of a
single representative agent. Hence, we interpret the investment strategy pi∗ as the equilibrium
strategy adopted by those agents with type vector ζ.
The equilibrium portfolio pi∗ consists of two components. The first, δµ/(σ2 + ν2), is the clas-
sical Merton portfolio in the absence of relative performance concerns. The second component
is always nonnegative, vanishing only in the absence of competition, i.e., when θ = 0. It in-
creases linearly with the competition weight θ, so we find that competition always increases the
allocation in the risky asset.
The representative agent’s strategy pi∗ is influenced by the other agents only through the
quantity ϕ/(1−ψ) = E[σpi∗]. This quantity can be viewed as the volatility of aggregate wealth.
Indeed, let X∗ denote the wealth process corresponding to pi∗ (i.e., the solution of (19)). The
average wealth of the population at time t ∈ [0, T ] is Yt := E[X
∗
t |F
B
T ]. A straightforward
computation using the independence of ζ, W , and B yields
Yt = E[ξ] + E[µpi
∗]t+ E[σpi∗]Bt.
Alternatively, we may interpret the ratio ϕ/(1 − ψ) in terms of the type distribution. Define
R = σ2/(σ2 + ν2), which is the fraction of the representative agent’s stock’s variance driven by
the common noise B. Then ϕ = E[Rδµ/σ] is computed by multiplying each agent’s Sharpe ratio
by her risk tolerance parameter and the weight R, then averaging over all agents. Similarly,
ψ = E[Rθ] is the average competition parameter, weighted by R. Several important factors will
lead to an increase in ϕ/(1 − ψ), and thus an increase in the investment pi∗ in the risky asset.
Namely, pi∗ increases as other agents become more risk tolerant (higher δ on average), as other
agents become more competitive (higher θ on average), or as the quality of the other stocks
increases, as measured by their Sharpe ratio (higher µ/σ on average).
Some of the effects of competition are more transparent in the single stock case of Corollary
11. The resulting MFE pi∗ clearly resembles the Merton portfolio but with effective risk tolerance
parameter
δeff := δ + θ
δ
1− θ
.
We always have δeff > δ if θ > 0, and the difference δeff − δ increases with θ, with δ, and with
θ. That is, the representative agent invests more in the risky asset if she is more competitive,
if other agents tend to be more risk tolerant, or if other agents tend to be more competitive.
In the latter cases, when δ and θ increase, we can interpret the increase in pi∗ as an effort, on
the part of the representative agent, to “keep up” with a population more willing to take risk.
At the extreme ends, as both θ and θ¯ approach 1, pi∗ blows up very quickly; that is, a highly
competitive agent in a population of highly competitive agents invests significantly in the risky
asset. This is illustrated in Figure 1 below.
A few other special cases are worth discussing. If σ = 0 a.s., there is no common noise. In
this case, ϕ = ψ = 0, and in turn the MFE is equal to the Merton portfolio. All agents act
independently uncompetitively, not taking into account the performance of their competitors.
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Figure 1. Single stock case (Corollary 11): pi∗ versus θ and θ¯, with δ = 5, δ¯ = 6,
and µ = σ = 1.
On the other hand, if ν = 0 a.s., there is no independent noise, and we have the simplifications
ψ = E[θ] and ϕ = E[δµ/σ]. If E[θ] < 1, then
pi∗ = δ
µ
σ2
+
θ
σ (1− E [θ])
E
[
δ
µ
σ
]
.
If ν = 0 a.s. and also E[θ] = 1, then θ = 1 a.s. and ψ = 1. In this case, every agent is concerned
exclusively with relative and not absolute performance, and there is no equilibrium.
Another degenerate case is when all agents have the same type vector, i.e., when ζ is deter-
ministic. Then, the MFE is common for all agents and (assuming θ < 1) reduces to
pi∗ =
δµ
(1− θ)σ2 + ν2
.
Lastly, we comment on the effect of population size on the equilibrium in the n-agent game
given in Theorem 3. The only real difference compared to the mean field setting is the rescaling
of ν2k by (1 − θk/n) wherever it appears in Theorem 3, with no rescaling present in the single
stock case of Corollary 4. It is not yet clear how to properly interpret this rescaling, and it is
worth noting that the change of variables discussed in Remark 5 does not significantly change
the situation. Interpreting the average wealth 1n−1
∑
j 6=iX
j
T as a liability term in an indifference
valuation problem, as we have mentioned before, seems promising, but we do not pursue this
any further here.
3. CRRA risk preferences
In this section we focus on power and logarithmic (CRRA) utilities. Given the homogeneity
properties of the power risk preferences, we choose to measure relative performance using a
multiplicative and not additive factor. Such cases were analyzed for a two-agent setting in [3]
and more recently in [2] under forward relative performance criteria.
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3.1. The n-agent game. We consider an n-agent game analogous to that of Section 2.1, but
where each agent has a CRRA utility. We work on the same filtered probability space of Section
2.1, and we assume that the n stocks have the same dynamics as in (1).
The n agents trade in a common investment horizon. As is common in power utility models,
the strategy piit is taken to be the fraction (as opposed to the amount) of wealth that agent i
invests in the stock Si at time t. Her discounted wealth is then given by
dXit = pi
i
tX
i
t
(
µidt+ νidW
i
t + σidBt
)
, (32)
with initial endowment Xi0 = x
i
0. The class of admissible strategies is as before the set A of
self-financing F-progressively measurable processes (pit)t∈[0,T ] satisfying E
∫ T
0 |pit|
2dt <∞.
The ith agent’s utility is a function Ui : R
2
+ → R of both her individual wealth, x, and the
geometric average wealth of all agents, m. Specifically,
Ui(x,m) := U(xm
−θi ; δi),
where U(x; δ) is defined for x > 0 and δ > 0 by
U(x; δ) :=
{(
1− 1δ
)−1
x1−
1
δ , for δ 6= 1,
log x for δ = 1.
The constant parameters δi > 0 and θi ∈ [0, 1] are the personal relative risk tolerance and
competition weight parameters, respectively.5 If agents i = 1, . . . , n choose admissible strategies
pi1, . . . , pin, the payoff for agent i is given by
Ji(pi
1, . . . , pin) := E
[
U
(
XiTX
−θi
T ; δi
)]
, where XT =
(
n∏
k=1
XkT
)1/n
. (33)
Notice that here, unlike in the exponential utility model, agents measure relative wealth using
the geometric mean, rather than the arithmetic mean. Working with the geometric mean instead
of the arithmetic mean renders the problem tractable, as it allows us to exploit the homogeneity
of the utility function.
The above expected utility may be rewritten more illustratively as
Ji(pi
1, . . . , pin) = E
[
U
(
(XiT )
1−θi(RiT )
θi ; δi
)]
,
where RiT = X
i
T /XT is the relative return for agent i. This clarifies the role of the competition
weight θi as governing the trade-off between absolute and relative wealth to agent i, as in the
exponential utility model. As before, an agent with a higher value of θi is more concerned with
relative wealth than with absolute wealth.
The notion of (Nash) equilibrium is defined exactly as in Definition 1, but with the new
objective function defined in (33) above. We find a unique constant equilibrium in the following
theorem, which we subsequently specialize to the single stock case.
5For CRRA utilities, it is more common to use the relative risk aversion parameter γi = 1/δi, but our choice
of parametrization ensures that the relative risk tolerance is precisely
δi = −
Ux(x; δi)
xUxx(x; δi)
.
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Theorem 14. Assume that for all i = 1, . . . , n we have xi0 > 0, δi > 0, θi ∈ [0, 1], µi > 0,
σi ≥ 0, νi ≥ 0, and σi + νi > 0. Define the constants
ϕn :=
1
n
n∑
k=1
δk
µkσk
σ2k + ν
2
k(1 + (δk − 1)θk/n)
(34)
and
ψn :=
1
n
n∑
k=1
θk(δk − 1)
σ2k
σ2k + ν
2
k(1 + (δk − 1)θk/n)
. (35)
There exists a unique constant equilibrium, given by
pii,∗ = δi
µi
σ2i + ν
2
i (1 + (δi − 1)θi/n)
− θi(δi − 1)
σi
σ2i + ν
2
i (1 + (δi − 1)θi/n)
ϕn
1 + ψn
. (36)
Moreover, we have the identity
1
n
n∑
k=1
σkpi
k,∗ =
ϕn
1 + ψn
.
Corollary 15 (Single stock). Assume that for all i = 1, . . . , n we have µi = µ > 0, σi = σ > 0,
and νi = 0. Define the constants
δ :=
1
n
n∑
k=1
δk and θ(δ − 1) :=
1
n
n∑
k=1
θk(δk − 1).
There exists unique constant equilibrium, given by
pii,∗ =
(
δi −
θi(δi − 1)δ
1 + θ(δ − 1)
)
µ
σ2
.
Proof. Apply Theorem 14, taking note of the simplifications ϕn = δµ/σ and ψn = θ(δ − 1). 
Remark 16. As in Remark 5 in the exponential utility model, one might modify our payoff
structure so that agent i excludes herself from the geometric mean XT . That is, one might
replace the payoff functional Ji defined in (33) by
E
[
U
(
XiT (X
(−i)
T )
−θ′i ; δ′i
)]
, where X
(−i)
T =
∏
k 6=i
XkT
1/(n−1) ,
for some parameters θ′i ∈ [0, 1] and δ
′
i > 0. By modifying the preference parameters, we may
view this payoff as a special case of ours. Indeed, by matching coefficients it is straightforward
to show that
U
(
XiT (X
(−i)
T )
−θ′i ; δ′i
)
= ciU
(
XiTX
−θi
T ; δi
)
,
for some constant ci > 0 (which does not influence the optimal strategies), when θi ∈ [0, 1] and
δi > 0 are defined by
δi =
δ′i
δ′i − (δ
′
i − 1)
(
1 + 1n−1θ
′
i
) and θi = θ′in−1
n +
1
nθ
′
i
.
However, this is only valid if (1 − 1/δ′i)
(
1 + 1n−1θ
′
i
)
< 1, which ensures that δi > 0. This
certainly holds for sufficiently large n. We favor our original parametrization because of the
relative simplicity of the formulas in Theorem 14 and Corollary 15, and because there is no
difference in the n→∞ limit.
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Proof of Theorem 14. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3, so we only highlight the main
steps. Fix an agent i and constant strategies αk ∈ R, for k 6= i. Define
Yt :=
∏
k 6=i
Xkt
1/n ,
where Xkt solves (32) with constant weights αk and X
k
0 = x
k
0 .
Setting Σk := σ
2
k + ν
2
k , we deduce that
d
(
logXkt
)
=
(
µkαk −
1
2
Σkα
2
k
)
dt+ νkαkdW
k
t + σkαkdBt.
In turn,
d (log Yt) =
1
n
∑
k 6=i
d logXkt =
(
µ̂α−
1
2
Σ̂α2
)
dt+
1
n
∑
k 6=i
νkαkdW
k
t + σ̂αdBt,
where we abbreviate
µ̂α :=
1
n
∑
k 6=i
µkαk, σ̂α :=
1
n
∑
k 6=i
σkαk,
Σ̂α2 :=
1
n
∑
k 6=i
Σα2k and (̂να)
2 :=
1
n
∑
k 6=i
ν2kα
2
k.
Thus, the process Yt solves
dYt
Yt
= ηdt+
1
n
∑
k 6=i
νkαkdW
k
t + σ̂αdBt, Y0 =
∏
k 6=i
xk0
1/n , (37)
with
η := µ̂α−
1
2
(
Σ̂α2 − σ̂α2 −
1
n
(̂να)2
)
.
The ith agent then solves the optimization problem
sup
pii∈A
E
[
U
(
(XiT )
1−θi/nY −θiT ; δi
)]
, (38)
where
dXit = pi
i
tX
i
t(µidt+ νidW
i
t + σidBt), X
i
0 = x
i
0,
with (Yt)t∈[0,T ] solving (37). We then obtain that the value (38) is equal to v(X
i
0, Y0, 0), where
v(x, y, t) solves the HJB equation
vt +max
pi∈R
(
1
2
(σ2i + ν
2
i )pi
2x2vxx + pi (µixvx + σiσ̂αxyvxy)
)
(39)
+
1
2
(
σ̂α2 +
1
n
(̂να)2
)
y2vyy + ηyvy = 0,
for (x, y, t) ∈ R+ × R+ × [0, T ], with terminal condition
v(x, y, T ) = U(x1−θi/ny−θi ; δi).
Applying the first order conditions, the maximum in (39) is attained by
pii,∗(x, y, t) = −
µixvx(x, y, t) + σiσ̂αxyvxy(x, y, t)
(σ2i + ν
2
i )x
2vxx(x, y, t)
. (40)
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In turn, equation (39) reduces to
vt −
1
2
(µixvx + σiσ̂αxyvxy)
2
(σ2i + ν
2
i )x
2vxx
+
1
2
(
σ̂α2 +
1
n
(̂να)2
)
y2vyy + ηyvy = 0. (41)
Working as in the proof of Theorem 3, we deduce that the above HJB equation has a unique
smooth solution (in an appropriate class of time-separable and space-homogeneous solutions),
and the optimal feedback control in (40) reduces to
pii,∗ =
δiµi − σiσ̂αθi(δi − 1)
(σ2i + ν
2
i )(δi − (1− θi/n)(δi − 1))
. (42)
We prove this in two cases:
(i) Suppose δi 6= 1. Making the ansatz
v(x, y, t) = U(x1−θi/ny−θi ; δi)f(t) = (1− 1/δi)
−1(x(1−θi/n)y−θi)1−1/δif(t)
reduces equation (41) to (1− 1/δi)
−1f ′(t) + ρf(t) = 0, with f(T ) = 1, where
ρ :=
(µi(1− θi/n)− σiσ̂αθi(1− θi/n)(1− 1/δi))
2
2(σ2i + ν
2
i )(1 − θi/n)(1 − (1− θi/n)(1 − 1/δi))
− ηθi
+
1
2
(
σ̂α2 +
1
n
(̂να)2
)
θi(1 + θi(1− 1/δi)).
We easily deduce that the solution of (41) is
v(x, y, t) = (1− 1/δi)
−1(x(1−θi/n)y−θi)1−1/δieρ(1−1/δi)(T−t),
and that (40) yields (42).
(ii) Suppose δi = 1. Making the ansatz
v(x, y, t) = U(x1−θi/ny−θi ; δi) + f(t) =
(
1−
θi
n
)
log x− θi log y + f(t)
reduces equation (41) to f ′(t) + ρ = 0, with f(T ) = 0 and
ρ :=
µ2i (1− θi/n)
2(σ2i + ν
2
i )
− θiη +
1
2
θi
(
σ̂α2 +
1
n
(̂να)2
)
.
In turn, the solution of (41) is given by
v(x, y, t) =
(
1−
θi
n
)
log x− θi log y + ρ(T − t),
and (40) reduces to pii,∗ = µi/(σ
2
i + ν
2
i ), which is consistent with (42) for δi = 1.
We conclude the proof as follows. For (α1, . . . , αn) to be a constant equilibrium, we must
have pii,∗ = αi, for each i = 1, . . . , n. Using (42) and abbreviating
σα :=
1
n
n∑
k=1
σkαk = σ̂α+
1
n
σiαi,
we deduce that we must have
αi =
µi − σiσαθi(1− 1/δi) + σ
2
i αi(θi/n)(1− 1/δi)
(σ2i + ν
2
i )(1− (1− θi/n)(1− 1/δi))
.
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Solving for αi yields,
αi =
µi − σiσαθi(1− 1/δi)
(σ2i + ν
2
i )(1 − (1− θi/n)(1 − 1/δi))
(
1−
σ2i (θi/n)(1 − 1/δi)
(σ2i + ν
2
i )(1− (1− θi/n)(1− 1/δi))
)−1
=
µi − σiσαθi(1− 1/δi)
(σ2i + ν
2
i )(1 − (1− θi/n)(1 − 1/δi))− σ
2
i (θi/n)(1− 1/δi)
=
µi − σiσαθi(1− 1/δi)
σ2i /δi + ν
2
i (1− (1− θi/n)(1− 1/δi))
=
µiδi − σiσαθi(δi − 1)
σ2i + ν
2
i (1− θi/n+ δiθi/n)
. (43)
Multiplying both sides by σi and averaging over i = 1, . . . , n give
σα = ϕn − ψnσα, (44)
where ϕn, ψn are as in (34) and (35). Because 1 + ψn > 0, equation (44) holds if and only if
σα = ϕn/(1 + ψn). We then deduce from (43) that the equilibrium strategy αi = pi
i,∗ is given
by (36). 
Remark 17. Note that equation (43) above has a unique solution for all parameter values.
In contrast, the analogous equation (29) in the exponential case has no solutions for certain
parameter values, which is why there were two cases in Theorem 3.
It is worth highlighting that, for the CRRA case, we assume that relative performance concerns
appear multiplicatively, and not additively. There are two reasons for this. First, as discussed
in the introduction, this is natural in modeling preferences which depend on relative return as
opposed to relative wealth; see also [3] for a discussion. The second reason is mathematical
tractability. We have already seen that using the geometric mean leads to explicit solutions.
To formulate an analogous problem using an arithmetic mean, we may consider the following
two possibilities. First, we may modify the optimization criterion to be of the form
U
(
XiT
1
n
∑n
i=1X
i
T
; δi
)
.
The challenge here is that the ratio appearing in the first argument cannot be expressed as the
solution of a one-dimensional SDE. The proofs of both Theorems 14 and 19 exploited the fact
that the geometric mean of geometric Brownian motions remains a geometric Brownian motion,
whereas the arithmetic mean enjoys no such properties.
Alternatively, we may use an optimization criterion of the form U(XiT−
1
n
∑n
i=1X
i
T ; δi), which,
however, runs into more serious problems because U(x, δi) is well-defined and finite only for x > 0
(or x ≥ 0 if δi > 1). Hence, this criterion would enforce the hard constraint X
i
T >
1
n
∑n
i=1X
i
T
a.s., which raises the two natural questions of how this constraint propagates to previous times
and whether this results in a meaningful class of solutions.
In short, using an arithmetic mean criterion would give rise to inter-dependent state and
control constraints which will likely render the problem intractable, and, at worst, could lead to
trivial or meaningless solutions.
3.2. The mean field game. This section studies the limit as n → ∞ of the n-player game
analyzed in the previous section, analogously to the treatment of the exponential case in Section
2.2.
We proceed with some informal arguments. Recall that the type vector of agent i is
ζi := (x
i
0, δi, θi, µi, νi, σi).
As before, the type vectors induce an empirical measure, which is the probability measure on
Zp := (0,∞) × (0,∞) × [0, 1] × (0,∞) × [0,∞) × [0,∞) (45)
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given by
mn(A) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
1A(ζi), for Borel sets A ⊂ Z
p.
Similarly to the exponential case, for a given agent i, the equilibrium strategy pii,∗ computed in
Theorem 14 depends only on her own type vector ζi and the distribution mn of type vectors,
and this enables the passage to the limit.
Assume now that mn has a weak limit m, in the sense that
∫
Zp
f dmn →
∫
Zp
f dm for every
bounded continuous function f on Zp. Let ζ = (ξ, δ, θ, µ, ν, σ) denote a random variable with
distribution m. Then, the optimal strategy pii,∗ (cf. (36)) should converge to
lim
n→∞
pii,∗ = δi
µi
σ2i + ν
2
i
− θi(δi − 1)
σi
σ2i + ν
2
i
ϕ
1− ψ
, (46)
where
ϕ := lim
n↑∞
ϕn = E
[
δ
µσ
σ2 + ν2
]
and ψ := lim
n↑∞
ψn = E
[
θ(δ − 1)
σ2
σ2 + ν2
]
.
As in the exponential case, we will demonstrate that this limiting strategy is indeed the equi-
librium of a mean field game, which we formulate analogously to Section 2.2.1.
Recall that W and B are independent Brownian motions and that the random variable ζ =
(ξ, δ, θ, µ, ν, σ) is independent of W and B. For the power case, the type vector ζ now takes
values in the space Zp. Furthermore, the filtration FMF is the smallest one satisfying the usual
assumptions for which ζ is FMF0 -measurable and W and B are adapted. Finally, recall that
FB = (FBt )t∈[0,T ] denotes the natural filtration generated by the Brownian motion B.
The representative agent’s wealth process solves
dXt = pitXt(µdt+ νdWt + σdBt), X0 = ξ, (47)
where the investment weight pi belongs to the admissible set AMF of F
MF-progressively mea-
surable real-valued processes satisfying E
∫ T
0 |pit|
2dt < ∞. Notice that, for all admissible pi, the
wealth process (Xt)t∈[0,T ] is strictly positive, as ξ > 0 a.s.
We denote by X an FMF0 -measurable random variable representing the geometric mean wealth
among the continuum of agents. Then, the objective of the representative agent is to maximize
the expected payoff
sup
pi∈AMF
E
[
U(XTX
−θ
; δ)
]
, (48)
where (Xt)t∈[0,T ] is given by (47).
The definition of a mean field equilibrium is analogous to Definition 9. However, one needs
to extend the notion of geometric mean appropriately to a continuum of agents. The geometric
mean of a measure m on (0,∞) is most naturally defined as
exp
(∫
(0,∞)
log y dm(y)
)
,
when log y is m-integrable. Indeed, when m is the empirical measure of n points (y1, . . . , yn),
this reduces to the usual definition (y1y2 · · · yn)
1/n.
Definition 18. Let pi∗ ∈ AMF be an admissible strategy, and consider the F
B
T -measurable ran-
dom variable X := expE[logX∗T | F
B
T ], where (X
∗
t )t∈[0,T ] is the wealth process in (47) correspond-
ing to the strategy pi∗. We say that pi∗ is a mean field equilibrium (MFE) if pi∗ is optimal for
the optimization problem (48) corresponding to this choice of X.
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A constant MFE is an FMF0 -measurable random variable pi
∗ such that, if pit := pi
∗ for all
t ∈ [0, T ], then (pit)t∈[0,T ] is a MFE.
The following theorem characterizes the constant MFE, recovering the limiting expressions
derived above from the n-agent equilibria.
Theorem 19. Assume that, a.s., δ > 0, θ ∈ [0, 1], µ > 0, σ ≥ 0, ν ≥ 0, and σ + ν > 0. Define
the constants
ϕ := E
[
δ
µσ
σ2 + ν2
]
and ψ := E
[
θ(δ − 1)
σ2
σ2 + ν2
]
,
where we assume that both expectations exist and are finite.
There exists a unique constant MFE, given by
pi∗ = δ
µ
σ2 + ν2
− θ(δ − 1)
σ
σ2 + ν2
ϕ
1 + ψ
. (49)
Moreover, we have the identity
E[σpi∗] =
ϕ
1 + ψ
.
In the single stock case, the form of the solution is essentially the same as in the n-agent
game, presented in Corollary 15:
Corollary 20 (Single stock). Suppose (µ, ν, σ) are deterministic, with ν = 0 and µ, σ > 0.
Define the constants
δ := E[δ] and θ(δ − 1) := E[θ(δ − 1)].
There exists a unique constant MFE, given by
pi∗ =
(
δ −
θ(δ − 1)δ
1 + θ(δ − 1)
)
µ
σ2
.
Proof of Theorem 19. As in the exponential case, we first reduce the optimal control problem
(48) to a low-dimensional Markovian one. To this end, it suffices to restrict our attention to
random variables X of the form
X = expE[logXαT |F
B
T ],
where Xα is the wealth process of (47) with an admissible constant strategy α. That is, α is an
FMF0 -measurable random variable satisfying E[α
2] <∞.
Define
Yt := expE[logX
α
t |F
B
T ].
Note that Yt = expE[logX
α
t |F
B
t ], for t ∈ [0, T ), because (Bs−Bt)s∈[t,T ] andX
α
t are independent.
In analogy to the exponential case, we identify the dynamics of Y and, in turn, treat it, as an
additional (uncontrolled) state process.
To this end, first use Itoˆ’s formula to get
d (logXαt ) =
(
µα−
1
2
(σ2 + ν2)α2
)
dt+ ναdWt + σαdBt.
Define Xˇαt := E[logX
α
t |F
B
T ], and note as with Yt above that Xˇ
α
t = E[logX
α
t |F
B
t ], for t ∈ [0, T ).
Setting
Σ := σ2 + ν2,
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and noting that (ξ, µ, σ, ν, α), W and B are independent, we compute
dXˇαt =
(
µα−
1
2
Σα2
)
dt+ σαdBt, (50)
where, again, we use the notation M = E[M ] for a generic integrable random variable M . In
turn,
dYt = de
Xˇαt = Yt (ηdt+ σαdBt) , Y0 = ξ, (51)
where η := µα− 12(Σα
2 − σα2).
To solve the stochastic optimization problem (48), we equivalently solve
sup
pi∈AMF
E
[
U(XTY
−θ
T ; δ)
]
(52)
with
dXt = pitXt(µdt+ νdWt + σdBt),
and (Yt)t∈[0,T ] solving (51). Then, as in the discussion of Section 2.2.2, the value of (52) is equal
to E[v(ξ, ξ, 0)], where v = v(x, y, t) is the unique smooth (strictly concave and strictly increasing
in x) solution of the HJB equation
vt +max
pi∈R
(
1
2
Σpi2x2vxx + pi (µxvx + σσαxyvxy)
)
+
1
2
σα2y2vyy + ηyvy = 0, (53)
with terminal condition v(x, y, T ) = U(xy−θ; δ). Notice that this HJB equation is random,
because of its dependence on the FMF0 -measurable type parameters.
Applying the first order conditions, the maximum in (53) is attained by
pi∗(x, y, t) = −
µxvx(x, y, t) + σσαxyvxy(x, y, t)
Σx2vxx(x, y, t)
. (54)
In turn, equation (53) reduces to
vt −
(µxvx + σσαxyvxy)
2
2Σx2vxx
+
1
2
σα2y2vyy + ηyvy = 0. (55)
Next, we claim that, for all (x, y, t),
pi∗(x, y, t) = Σ−1 (µδ − θ(δ − 1)σσα) . (56)
We prove this in two cases:
(i) Suppose δ 6= 1. Making the ansatz
v(x, y, t) = U(xy−θ; δ)f(t) = (1− 1/δ)−1 x1−1/δy−θ(1−1/δ)f(t),
reduces equation (55) to f ′(t) + ρf(t) = 0, with f(T ) = 1, where
ρ :=
(µδ − θ(δ − 1)σσα)2
2Σ(δ − 1)
− ηθ(1− 1/δ)−1 +
1
2
σα2θ(θ + (1− 1/δ)−1).
We easily deduce that the solution of (55) is
v(x, y, t) = (1− 1/δ)−1 x1−1/δy−θ(1−1/δ) exp(ρ(T − t)),
and that (54) yields (56).
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(ii) Suppose δ = 1. It is easily checked that the solution v of (55) is given by
v(x, y, t) = log x− θ log y + ρ(T − t),
with
ρ :=
µ2
2Σ
− ηθ +
1
2
θσα2.
In this case, (54) becomes pi∗(x, y, t) = µ/Σ, which is consistent with (56) for δ = 1.
Recalling Definition 18, we see that for the candidate control α to be a constant MFE, we
need α = pi∗. In light of (18), pi∗ is a constant MFE if it solves the equation
pi∗ = Σ−1
(
µδ − θ(δ − 1)σσpi∗
)
. (57)
Multiply both sides by σ and average to find that σpi∗ must satisfy
σpi∗ = E
[
δ
µσ
Σ
]
− E
[
θ(δ − 1)
σ2
Σ
]
σpi∗ = ϕ− ψσpi∗.
We then deduce that σα = ϕ/(1 + ψ), and plugging this into (56) we obtain (49). 
3.3. Discussion of the equilibrium. Some of the structural properties of the equilibrium are
similar to those observed in the CARA model in Section 2.3. We again focus the discussion here
on the mean field case of Theorem 19 and Corollary 20, as the n-agent equilibria of Theorem 14
and Corollary 15 have essentially the same structure. The only difference is the rescaling of ν2k
by (1 + (δk − 1)θk/n) wherever it appears in Theorem 14. We first discuss the general case of
Theorem 19, before concentrating on the single stock case of Corollary 20.
3.3.1. The general case. The MFE pi∗ of Theorem 19 can be written as the sum of two compo-
nents, pi∗ = pi∗(1) + pi
∗
(2), where pi
∗
(1) = δµ/(σ
2 + ν2) is the classical Merton portfolio, and
pi∗(2) := −θ(δ − 1)
σ
σ2 + ν2
ϕ
1 + ψ
.
The second component pi∗(2) isolates the linear effect of the competition parameter θ. Notably,
pi∗(2) vanishes when θ = 0.
Interestingly, the effect of competition is quite different in the CRRAmodel than in the CARA
model, in the sense that competition now leads some agents to invest less in the risky asset than
they would in the absence of competition. Indeed, the sign of pi∗(2) is the same as that of (1− δ),
assuming θ > 0 and σ > 0. Thus, agents with δ < 1 invest more as θ increases, whereas agents
with δ > 1 invest less. In particular, we have pi∗(2) = 0 when δ = 1; that is, agents with log
utility are not competitive, which is also easily deduced from the original problem formulation.
In fact, a highly risk-tolerant and competitive agent may choose to short the stock. That is,
if δ > 1 and θ is close to 1, pi∗ may be negative. This typically occurs when δ is much higher
than their population averages, or, in other words, when the representative agent is very risk
tolerant and competitive relative to the other agents.
The representative agent’s strategy pi∗ is influenced by the other agents only through the
quantity ϕ/(1 + ψ) = E[σpi∗], and, as in Section 2.3, we can view this quantity as the volatility
of the aggregate wealth. Indeed, let X∗ denote the wealth process corresponding to pi∗ (i.e., the
solution of (47) using the strategy pi∗). The geometric average wealth of the population at time
t ∈ [0, T ] is Yt := logE[exp(X
∗
t )|F
B
T ], and, as we saw in the proof of Theorem 19, it satisfies
dYt = Yt (ηdt+ E[σpi
∗]dBt) .
Alternatively, the ratio ϕ/(1+ψ) can be interpreted directly in terms of the type distribution.
Define R = σ2/(σ2 + ν2), and note that ϕ = E[Rδµ/σ] and ψ = E[Rθ(δ − 1)]. Notice that the
assumptions on the parameter ranges ensure that 1+ψ > 0. As before, the numerator ϕ increases
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as the quality of the other stocks increases, as measured by their Sharpe ratio. However, the
ratio ϕ/(1+ψ) may not increase as the population becomes more risk tolerant (i.e., as δ increases
on average), as both the numerator and denominator increase in this case.
The dependence of ϕ/(1 +ψ) and thus of pi∗ on the type distribution is rather complex. The
distribution of competition weights θ appears only through ψ, and its effect is mediated by the
risk tolerance δ. Loosely speaking, the population average of θ can have a positive or negative
effect on pi∗(2) depending on the “typical” sign of (1 − δ). These complexities are more easily
unraveled in the single stock case.
3.3.2. Single stock case. From the results of Corollary 20, we may write the equilibrium portfolio
in the single stock case as
pi∗ = ((1− kθ)δ + kθ)
µ
σ2
, (58)
where
k :=
δ¯
1 + θ(δ − 1)
. (59)
The equilibrium pi∗ can thus be written as a Merton portfolio, pi∗ = δeffµ/σ
2, with effective
risk tolerance parameter
δeff := (1− kθ)δ + kθ = δ −
θ(δ − 1)δ
1 + θ(δ − 1)
. (60)
This representation simplifies some of the complex dependencies of pi∗ on the type distribution
mentioned in the previous paragraph. For instance, suppose θ and δ are uncorrelated, so that
θ(δ − 1) = θ(δ−1). If δ > 1, then |δeff−δ| is decreasing in θ. That is, if the average risk tolerance
is high, then, as the population becomes more competitive (i.e. θ increases), the representative
agent behaves less competitively in the sense that δeff moves closer to δ. On the other hand, if
δ < 1, then |δeff − δ| is increasing in θ. That is, if the average risk tolerance is low, then, as the
population becomes more competitive, the representative agent behaves more competitively in
the sense that δeff moves away from δ. Again, if δ = 1, then θ and θ play no role whatsoever.
More interesting is the joint effect of (δ, θ) on pi∗, when the other parameters are fixed. Still
assuming θ and δ are uncorrelated, notice that the value of k can range between 1 and δ, as θ
varies between 0 and 1. Hence, if θδ > 1, then there is a critical value, θcrit := (θδ − 1)/(δ − 1),
at which the effect of δ on pi∗ changes sign. When the population is highly competitive (i.e.,
θ > θcrit), the investment pi
∗ in the risky asset increases with the risk tolerance δ, as one might
expect. On the other hand, when the population is less competitive (i.e., θ < θcrit), pi
∗ is
decreasing in δ. This effect is illustrated in Figure 2.
A similar transition appears in the joint effect of (δ, θ) on pi∗, when the other parameters are
fixed. When k ≤ 1 (which is equivalent to δ ≤ 1 if we assume θ and δ are uncorrelated), then
the risky invesment pi∗ is increasing in the risk tolerance δ, for any value of θ. On the other
hand, if k < 1, then pi∗ is increasing in δ if and only if θ < 1/k. This situation is illustrated in
Figure 3. Note that these effects are more pronounced if δ and θ are positively correlated and
less pronounced if they are negatively correlated.
There are two ways to explain the counter-intuitive phenomenon described in the previous two
paragraphs, in which pi∗ may be decreasing in δ for certain (fixed) values of the other parameters.
This regime happens precisely when 1 < kθ. Assuming again that θ and δ are uncorrelated, the
latter inequality is equivalent to
θ >
1
δ
(1− θ) + θ.
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Figure 2. Single stock case (Corollary 20): pi∗ versus δ and θ, with θ = 3/4,
δ = 2, µ = 5, and σ = 1. Here, θ and δ are uncorrelated, and θcrit = 1/2
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Figure 3. Single stock case (Corollary 20): pi∗ versus δ and θ, with θ = 1/5,
δ = 2, and µ = 5, σ = 1. Here δ and θ are uncorrelated, and k = 5/3.
Assume for the sake of argument that δ is extremely large. In the limit δ → ∞, we see that
1 < kθ if and only if θ > θ, and the expression for pi∗ becomes
pi∗ =
((
1−
θ
θ
)
δ +
θ
θ
)
µ
σ2
.
There are two immediate observations:
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(i) If θ < θ and δ is large, then pi∗ is positive and large. That is, less competitive agents go
long.
(ii) If θ > θ and δ is large, then pi∗ is very negative. That is, competitive agents go short.
The first case, θ < θ, is natural: A less competitive agent behaves more like a Merton investor,
with pi∗ increasing in δ. On the other hand, we may explain the second regime, θ > θ, as
follows. Still assuming that the average risk tolerance is very large, we know from (i) that most
other agents will take large long positions in the stock. If our representative agent were to go
long, he could not afford to accept enough risk to go as long as the other investors. Then, if
the stock price goes up, the representative agent may achieve a high absolute performance but
would suffer in terms of relative performance, as the other agents who invested even more in the
stock would earn even higher returns. Hence, a natural strategy is to short the stock, to focus
on gains from outperforming competitors when the stock price drops, rather than focusing on
absolute performance. This is still reasonable if the representative agent is himself quite risk
tolerant, willing to accept risk in the opposite direction as the more Merton-like investors. Note
that these effects are less pronounced but still present outside of the asymptotic regime δ →∞.
There is an alternative explanation in the spirit of [3, pp. 13-14]. A risk averse agent typically
seeks to minimize volatility by investing less in the stock than a more risk tolerant agent. How-
ever, relative performance concerns provide an additional source of volatility. A risk averse agent
may then invest heavily in the stock in an attempt to mitigate losses from being outperformed.
3.3.3. Some additional special cases. A few other special cases are worth discussing. If σ = 0
a.s., there is no common noise. In this case, ϕ = ψ = 0, and in turn the MFE is equal to the
Merton portfolio, which means that the agents are not at all competitive. On the other hand,
if ν = 0 a.s., there is no independent noise. In this case, ϕ = E[δµ/σ] and ψ = E[θ(δ − 1)], and
the optimal portfolio becomes
pi∗ = δ
µ
σ2
−
θ(δ − 1)
σ(1 + E[θ(δ − 1)])
E
[
δ
µ
σ
]
.
Lastly, if all agents have the same type vector (i.e., ζ is deterministic), then pi∗ is deterministic
and, furthermore,
pi∗ =
δµ
(1 + θ(δ − 1))σ2 + ν2
.
4. Conclusions and extensions
We have considered optimal portfolio management problems under relative performance con-
cerns for both finite and infinite populations. The agents have a common investment horizon
and either CARA or CRRA risk preferences, and they trade individual stocks with log-normal
dynamics driven by both common and idiosyncratic noises. They face competition in that their
individual utility criteria depend on both their individual wealth as well as the wealth of the
others. We have explicitly constructed the associated constant Nash and mean field equilibria.
Our study points to several directions for future research. A first direction is to further
analyze the finite population problems by using concepts from indifference valuation. Indeed, as
we mentioned in the proof of Theorem 3, we may identify the effect of competition as a liability
and, in turn, solve an indifference valuation problem. Similarly, for the CRRA case, one may
relate the competition to a multiplicative liability factor. There is a fundamental difference,
of course, between the classical indifference pricing problems and the ones herein; namely, the
liability is essentially endogenous, as it depends on the actions of the agents. Nevertheless,
employing indifference valuation arguments is expected to yield a clearer financial interpretation
of the equilibrium strategies by relating them to indifference hedging strategies. It will also
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permit an analysis of sensitivity effects of varying agents’ population size using arguments from
the so-called relative indifference valuation. Such questions are left for future work.
Herein, the fund managers are only concerned with maximization of utility coming from
terminal wealth (both absolute and relative to other agents), but one could also incorporate
intermediate consumption. There are two natural ways to do this, discussed only for the CRRA
model for concreteness. First, one might add a utility-of-consumption term to the optimization
criterion (33) and modify the individual wealth process to
dXit = pi
i
tX
i
t(µidt+ νidW
i
t + σidBt)− C
i
tdt.
While the calculations may be tedious, we expect that this problem is tractable. A more
interesting approach would build on the first by incorporating relative consumption standards,
modeled as constraints in the form of lower bounds on the rate of consumption, which could
themselves depend on the consumption of other agents. This setting would reflect the more
realistic situation in which individual consumption standards are affected by the behavior of
other agents.
An important assumption of the model herein is that each agent has full information of
the individual preference and market parameters of each other agent. This is also the main
modeling ingredient in [3] and is partially defended by the fact that fund managers post their
returns publicly, and from these announcements certain information can in turn be inferred by
their competitors. While this is undoubtedly a considerable modeling limitation, our results
give new solutions to existing problems, especially for mean field games with non-quadratic
criteria. Furthermore, this assumption of common knowledge may be relaxed if one introduces
ambiguity around the publicly posted competitors’ parameters. This ambiguity may be, for
example, modeled through an error margin depending on individual views. This would give rise
to a class of interesting mean field games with filtering.
In a different direction, a natural generalization of our model would allow agents to invest in
any of the stocks, not just the individual stock assigned to them. Such a case has been recently
analyzed in [3], and in [2] under forward performance criteria. Important questions arise on the
effects of competition to asset specialization. While such generalization might be intractable
for the finite population setting, a mean field formulation may provide a more tractable frame-
work for studying the interactive role of competition and asset familiarity, specialization and
competition.
Finally, one may extend the current model to dynamically evolving markets and rolling hori-
zons. Such generalization may be analyzed under forward performance criteria, extending the
results of [2], and would lead naturally to a new class of mean field games. It would also allow
for further extending the concept of benchmarking under forward criteria, introduced in [47].
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